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President Eisenhower, Economic Policy, 
and the 1960 Presidential Election 
This article examines economic policy in the Eisenhower years and the presi- 
dent's role in the 1960 election. I measure the impact of changes in fiscal policy on 
real GNP and show that policy in 1959 was unusually contractionary and cannot 
be dismissed as merely evidence of Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism. 
A dlai Stevenson once described the "liberal hour" as that time before presidential elections when "even the most obsolete Repub- 
lican becomes momentarily reconciled to the machine age."' For the 
most fiscally conservative president of the postwar period the liberal 
hour never arrived. In the 1956 and 1960 presidential elections President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to engage in expansionary policies to 
enhance his or his party's chances for re-election. 
Eisenhower's refusal to stimulate the economy before either presi- 
dential election raises serious questions about the validity of the 
political business cycle hyp~thes i s .~  According to this hypothesis, 
presidents will engage in contractionary policies in the early years of 
their terms to reduce inflation, then use expansionary policies before the 
presidential election to reduce unemployment and reap the electoral 
rewards of an expanding economy. 
The economic policies of the Eisenhower administration provide a 
particularly intriguing case in the study of political business cycles 
because Eisenhower's policies were inconsistent with the general 
political business cycle pattern. Whereas real disposable income per 
capita increased in eight of eleven presidential and congressional 
election years during the administrations of Harry Truman, John 
Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, it de- 
clined in every election year during the Eisenhower admini~tration.~ As 
Stephen Weatherford points out, Eisenhower provides the deviant case 
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because "conditions were ripe for a political business cycle in 1954, 
1958, and 1960, yet he explicitly abjured the temptation."4 
While Eisenhower had little need to stimulate the economy in 1956 
with a solid lead in the polls over the Democratic front runner Adlai 
Stevenson, Vice President Richard Nixon could certainly have bene- 
fited from at least a momentary lapse in Eisenhower's fiscal frugality in 
1960. Not only was the unemployment rate higher in 1960 than 1956, but 
the economy appeared to be sliding into another recession.* Moreover, 
voter surveys from August 1959 through August 1960 showed Kennedy 
and Nixon virtually tied in the ~011s .~  
There are, of course, various interpretations of Eisenhower's eco- 
nomic policy actions before the 1960 presidential election. Economists 
have generally dismissed them as evidence of his unflinching fiscal 
conser~at ism.~ Yet historians have consistently remarked upon the 
seeming ambivalence of Eisenhower toward Nixon's bid for the presi- 
dency in 1960.' 
This article examines fiscal policy during the Eisenhower administra- 
tion and explores President Eisenhower's role in the 1960 election. 
Impact measures are developed that provide a more complete picture of 
policy changes and allow us to assess their effect on economic activity 
and to understand the complex array of factors influencing Eisenhow- 
er's policies before the 1960 election. 
OVERVIEW OF FISCAL POLICY IN THE EISENHOWER YEARS 
Reflecting upon the 1960 presidential campaign Nixon later wrote: 
"In a losing campaign, only the candidate is responsible for the tactics 
that led to defeat."9 Henry Cabot Lodge apparently agreed. Upon 
viewing the first Nixon-Kennedy debate Lodge erupted: "That son- 
of-a-bitch just lost us the ele~tion!" '~ At other times, however, Nixon 
expressed the belief that the outcome of the election was the result of 
something beyond his control-the state of the economy." 
The downturn which began officially in the second quarter of 1960 was 
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certainly not a complete surprise to administration officials. In February 
1960 Arthur Burns, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors 
during the first Eisenhower administration, advised the vice president 
that the economy was heading for another contraction and suggested 
that "steps be taken immediately" to increase federal expenditures and 
loosen credit.12 Burns's advice was relayed to Eisenhower and dis- 
cussed at the next Cabinet meeting. 
Eisenhower did not take the advice. According to Nixon, the admin- 
istration was unwilling to act to stimulate the economy until the 
downturn became more severe.13 In subsequent quarters, however, 
unemployment increased from an already high 5.2 percent in the second 
quarter to 6.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 1960, and real GNP 
declined in the second, third, and fourth quarters.14 The Eisenhower 
administration chose to deal with the economic downturn by ignoring it. 
Throughout 1960, until his final budget message in January 1961, 
Eisenhower warned of the hazards of inflation and promised not to 
"undermine our strength as a nation through  deficit^."'^ 
Although Eisenhower was often accused of having a balanced budget 
fetish, he was, after all, a postwar Republican who, at least in principle, 
was willing to accept budget deficits during recessions.16 While the 
actual federal budget was in surplus when economic activity was 
expanding, it moved to a deficit during the three recessions of 1953- 
1954, 1957-1958, and 1960, and there was no attempt to raise taxes to 
offset the reduction in revenue associated with the downturn.17 In 
addition, although fiscal policy became more contractionary during the 
1953-1954 recession, the full-employment budget showed a rather large 
deficit in early 1953. Likewise, while the full-employment budget was in 
surplus during the entire 1957-1958 recession, its size declined from 
$7.2 billion in the third quarter of 1957 to $2.4 billion by the fourth 
quarter of 1958. 
Most interesting, however, is the full-employment budget for 1960. 
The full-employment budget surplus rose to $15.1 billion in the fourth 
quarter of 1960, its highest level of the entire Eisenhower term. 
Moreover, as the economy slid into recession, fiscal policy became 
tighter. The full-employment budget went from a surplus of $4.6 billion 
in 1958 to a surplus of $14.7 billion in 1960. 
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IMPACT MEASURES OF FISCAL POLICY 
While the full-employment budget provides a better measure of the 
thrust of fiscal policy than the actual federal budget, impact measures 
provide additional insight into the direction, magnitude, and composi- 
tion of the changes in fiscal policy.1g These measures are generated 
using a macroeconometric model to estimate the impact of changes 
in fiscal policy in a given quarter on real GNP four quarters in the fu- 
ture. l9 
The aggregate fiscal policy impact measure is generated by comparing 
simulated real GNP with the actual changes in fiscal policy that occurred 
in a particular quarter against simulated real GNP without them. The 
influence of fiscal policy in time t on real GNP Y, in period t + j is thus: 
Ten fiscal policy variables are held constant in the Y* simulation. 
They are real federal government purchases of goods, personal income 
tax rate, profit tax rate, indirect business tax rate, employee social 
security tax rate, employer social security tax rate, civilian jobs, 
military jobs, transfer payments to households, and grants-in-aid to 
state and local governments.20 
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that fiscal policy was highly 
contractionary in Eisenhower's first term. Although fiscal policy in 1953 
was expansionary, increasing estimated real GNP by $8.8 billion in 
1954, this largely reflected the influence of the Truman admini~tration.~~ 
The aggregate impact measures for 1954 reveal that fiscal policy was 
exceedingly contractionary, reducing estimated real GNP by $25.2 
billion in 1955. This represents the largest yearly decline of the 
Eisenhower tenure. Moreover, fiscal policy was contractionary in every 
quarter of 1954-the only year in which this is true. 
While contractionary policy in the early half of Eisenhower's first 
term is consistent with the political business cycle hypothesis, the 
impact measures do not indicate that fiscal policy became expansionary 
before the presidential election of 1956. While fiscal policy was more 
expansionary in 1955 and 1956 than it was in 1954, it still reduced 
estimated real GNP by $5.1 billion in 1956 and $490 million in 1957. 
The method used to estimate the impact measures is presented in Alan S .  Blinder and Stephen 
M. Goldfeld, "New Measures of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 1958-1973," American Economic 
Review, 66 (Dec. 1976), pp. 78LL96. 
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TABLE 1 
AGGREGATE FISCAL POLICY IMPACT MEASURES ON REAL GNP 
(billions of dollars) 
Quarters 
Yearly 
Year First Second Third Fourth Total 
1953 $ 3.885 $ 2.811 $-0.767 $ 2.852 $ 8.781 
1954 -11.328 -8.199 -3.482 -2.177 -25.187 
1955 - 1.934 -3.459 2.566 -2.233 -5.059 
1956 -0.400 1.360 -3.111 1.661 -0.490 
1957 6.987 1.995 -1.051 2.146 10.078 
1958 5.168 6.083 1.800 2.472 15.524 
1959 -6.674 -1.105 - 1.989 0.380 -9.388 
1960 -4.927 2.162 2.375 2.524 2.134 
Notes: The impact measure shows the effect of changes in fiscal policy on real GNP four quarters 
later. For example, fiscal policy in the first quarter of 1953 was expansionary, causing estimated 
real GNP in the first quarter of 1954 to be $3.88 billion higher than it would have been otherwise. 
Sources: The impact measures were generated using the Fairmodel macroeconometric model, 
version 2.0, July 1985. 
In contrast, the aggregate impact measures indicate that fiscal policy 
was quite expansionary in 1957 and 1958, increasing estimated real GNP 
by $10.1 and $15.5 billion in succeeding years. However, more inter- 
esting is the result which shows that fiscal policy in 1959 was highly 
contractionary, causing estimated real GNP to decline by $9.4 billion in 
the presidential election year of 1960. Furthermore, although fiscal 
policy was moderately expansionary in 1960, most of the expansionary 
policies occurred late in the year and would not have had an impact on 
the economy until after the election. 
The disaggregated impact measures provide more detailed informa- 
tion concerning fiscal policy changes. These measures are generated in 
a similar fashion to the aggregate ones and allow us to isolate the impact 
of a single policy variable on real GNP. 
The disaggregated measures in Table 2 reveal that real federal 
purchases of goods were indeed highly contractionary in 1954, causing 
estimated real GNP to decline by $28.3 billion. In addition, changes in 
military jobs exerted a contractionary influence early in Eisenhower's 
first term, reducing estimated real GNP $1.5 billion and $2.2 billion in 
1954 and 1955. The reduction in federal purchases of goods and in 
military jobs reflects the decreased spending following the Korean 
conflict as well as the Eisenhower administration's attempt to reduce 
nondefense expenditures. In contrast, changes in transfer payments to 
households, personal income taxes, and indirect business taxes some- 
what offset the contractionary influence of federal government pur- 
chases of goods. 
In 1954 transfer payments to households increased estimated real 
GNP by a rather large $3.3 billion. Although this may appear to indicate 
TABLE 2 
DISAGGREGATED FISCAL POLICY IMPACT MEASURES ON REAL GNP 
(yearly totals in billions of dollars) 
Fiscal Policy 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Federal Government $ 8.390 $-28.304 $-2.819 $ 0.013 $ 3.701 $ 8.381 $-6.606 $ 0.428 
Purchases of 
Goods 
Personal Income 0.164 0.994 -0.156 -0.385 0.065 0.306 -0.328 -0.369 
Tax Rate 
Profit Tax Rate 0.097 0.118 -0.059 0.074 0.028 -0.036 0.009 0.190 
Indirect Business 0.220 0.959 -0.232 -0.518 0.681 0.064 -0.119 -0.091 
Tax Rate 
Employee Social -0.032 -0.283 -0.070 -0.114 -0.265 0.019 -0.290 -0.489 
Security Tax Rate 
Employer Social 0.057 -0.119 -0.042 -0.024 -0.048 0.062 -0.219 -0.213 
Security Tax Rate 
Civilian Jobs -0.961 -0.311 0.053 0.118 -0.353 0.153 0.297 -0.020 
Military Jobs -0.174 -1.524 -2.179 -0.811 -0.618 -0.742 -0.669 0.001 
Transfer Payments 1.120 3.332 0.398 1.626 4.163 3.724 1.139 2.639 
to Households 
Grants-in-aid to 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.011 -0.009 0.003 
State and Local 
Governments 
Sources: See Table 1 .  
that discretionary fiscal policy was expansionary, it reflects instead the 
influence of nondiscretionary changes resulting from the recession of 
1953-1954.~~ 
Changes in the personal income tax rate do, however, reflect discre- 
tionary fiscal policy, and the 1954 changes exerted the largest expan- 
sionary influence of any of the Eisenhower years-increasing estimated 
real GNP by $994 million in 1955. This expansion does not, however, 
reflect countercyclical policy on the part of the Eisenhower administra- 
tion. The reduction in personal income taxes was previously enacted by 
Congress and rather reluctantly signed into law by ~ i s e n h o w e r . ~ ~  
Although the reduction in personal income taxes was offset somewhat 
by an increase in social security taxes in 1954, a reduction in excise 
taxes enacted by Congress and signed into law in March 1954 also 
exerted an expansionary impact on the economy. Changes in the excise 
tax rate during 1954 expanded estimated real GNP by $959 million in 
1955--exerting the largest expansionary impact for that variable in any 
of the years reported. Although the reduction in excise taxes was 
instigated by Republicans in Congress as an antirecession action, the 
administration did not oppose the bill, given the state of the economy. 
22 Whereas other fiscal policy variables used here largely reflect discretionary changes in policy, 
transfer payments to households reflect both discretionary and nondiscretionary changes due to 
automatic stabilizers. 
23 See the Economic Report of the President, 1955 (Washington, DC, 1955), p. 19. 
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This result confirms Herbert Stein's observation that the "excise tax cut 
was the largest stimulating fiscal action of 1954 which would not have 
been taken if there had been no r e c e ~ s i o n . " ~ ~  
The disaggregated measures provide further evidence that the con- 
tractionary policies before the 1956 presidential election were no 
accident. The largest expansionary influence of 1955 and 1956 came 
from transfer payments to households, which largely reflects nondiscre- 
tionary policy changes. All other changes in 1955, except that in civilian 
employment, exerted a contractionary influence on real GNP in the 
presidential election year of 1956. 
Fiscal policy of 1957 and 1958 appears to have been quite expansion- 
ary, causing estimated real GNP to increase $10.1 and $15.5 billion. 
Although a significant proportion of the expansion was the result of 
increases in transfer payments to households and reflects the effect of 
automatic stabilizers, federal spending on goods was also expansionary.25 
Federal expenditures were buoyed up by an increase in the purchase of 
farm commodities for farm price supports, acceleration in defense 
contract spending, and an increase in highway  expenditure^.^^ 
While fiscal policy was expansionary in 1957 and 1958, it became 
unquestionably contractionary in 1959. The disaggregated measures 
indicate that federal purchases of goods in 1959 were such that esti- 
mated real GNP would decline by $6.6 billion in 1960-the largest 
decline due to purchases for any year except the highly contractionary 
one of 1954. The decline in federal purchases of goods in part reflected 
a substantial reduction in defense-related expenditures.27 In addition, 
an increase in social security taxes in both 1959 and 1960 also depressed 
estimated real GNP. 
In 1960 changes in federal government purchases of goods were more 
expansionary than in 1959, increasing estimated real GNP by a modest 
$428 million. Most of the expansionary policies, however, came in the 
third quarter of 1960. Furthermore, the disaggregated figures show that 
increases in transfer payments to households provided most of the 
expansionary influence. Transfer payments to households in 1960 
increased estimated real GNP by $2.6 billion, up from $1.1 billion the 
previous year due to the slowdown in economic activity in 1960. 
The fiscal policy impact measures, along with the full-employment 
budget figures, provide interesting grist for our analysis of economic 
policy in the 1950s. Both the full-employment budget and the impact 
measures indicate that the policies of the Eisenhower administration do 
24 Stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 305. 
25 A proportion of the increase in transfer payments to households was due to the legislative 
extension of unemployment compensation payments. 
26 See Wilfred Lewis, Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions (Washington, DC, 1962), 
pp. 208-13. 
27 Ibid., pp. 237-39. 
not correspond to the political business cycle pattern of contraction in 
the early years of the presidential term and expansion before the 
presidential election. Moreover, the fiscal policy impact measures show 
more clearly the highly contractionary character of policy in 1954 and 
1959. While the contractionary policies of 1954 reflect the transition 
from a wartime to a peacetime economy, the economic policies before 
the 1960 election are less easily explained. 
THEMES O F  CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY 
Economists have traditionally dismissed the policies preceding the 
1960 presidential election as evidence of Eisenhower's ongoing fiscal 
conservatism. While Eisenhower's undeniable commitment to Repub- 
lican principles and his relentless budget surplus rhetoric made him 
appear to be "the rock of fiscal probity," the policies before the 1960 
election cannot be dismissed as evidence of his c o n ~ e r v a t i s m . ~ ~  
Throughout his tenure the president presented an unusually consis- 
tent theme reaffirming traditional Republican values and goals, chief 
among which was a belief in a minimal role for government in the 
economic sphere. For Eisenhower, this minimal role was inspired by 
the belief in the efficiency of the private sector in allocating resources 
and promoting economic growth.29 Minimal taxation was desirable so as 
not to stifle individual initiative or put undue pressure on financial 
markets.30 Moreover, the one goal which resonates throughout Eisen- 
hower's papers is that of achieving economic growth without inflation. 
Maintaining a budget surplus was the primary mechanism through 
which low inflation was to be achieved. 
Eisenhower's willingness to endure budget deficits became apparent 
during the 1953-1954 recession and again during the 1957-1958 reces- 
sion. While it is no doubt true that a budget surplus had monumental 
significance to Eisenhower, as Stein points out, "the desirability of 
balancing the budget was not given by some eternal principle, but 
depended on economic conditions which would vary. "3' 
In addition, the growing surpluses of the actual and full-employment 
budgets occurred in years when inflation became more problematic. In 
1955, 1956, and 1957 the rate of inflation was above 3 percent, up from 
1.6 percent in 1953 and 1954, and the full-employment budget surplus 
increased from $3.9 billion in 1955 to $6.4 billion in 1 9 5 8 . ~ ~  Thus, 
Eisenhower's fiscal policy from 1953 through 1958 reflected consistent 
but flexible fiscal conservatism. The size of the budget surplus increased 
Jonathan Hughes, American Economic Growth (Glenview, 1987), p. 513. 
29 Economic Report of the President, 1956 (Washington, DC, 1956). pp. 72-79. 
'O Public Papers of the Presidents, 1960-61, p. 40. 
" Stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 283. 
32 See the Economic Report of the President, 1988, p. 253. 
1960 Presidential Election 
with inflation but not during periods of recession. Fiscal policy after 
1958, however, was quite different. 
Both the actual and the full-employment budget figures indicate that 
fiscal policy became quite contractionary in 1959 and 1960. The actual 
federal budget went from a deficit of $10.3 billion in 1958 to a surplus of 
$3.4 billion in 1960 while the full-employment budget went from a 
surplus of $4.6 billion in 1958 to a surplus of $14.7 billion in 1 9 6 0 . ~ ~  The 
impact measures demonstrate that fiscal policy became exceedingly 
contractionary in 1959, depressing estimated real GNP by $9.4 billion in 
1960. 
This severely contractionary fiscal policy is not consistent with the 
flexible fiscal conservatism of the early Eisenhower years. Whereas 
increases in the budget surplus were associated with increases in 
inflation from 1955 through 1958, as it moderated in 1958, 1959, and 
1960, the surplus continued to expand significantly. Furthermore, while 
increases in the unemployment rate brought about more moderate fiscal 
policy in the first six years of the Eisenhower administration, increases 
in unemployment in 1959 and 1960 were met with a more contractionary 
policy. 
It might, of course, be argued that Eisenhower was unaware of the 
extent to which fiscal policy was contractionary in the period before the 
1960 election. After all, the full-employment budget was a new concept 
in the late 1950s. Nevertheless, estimates of the full-employment budget 
were publicly available in 1960. According to Stein, staff members of the 
Council of Economic Advisors presented estimates of the full-employ- 
ment budget in 1960 and argued that the enlarged surplus was contrib- 
uting to the sluggishness of the economy.34 
Because fiscal policy is ultimately the result of the interaction of 
congressional as well as presidential action, it might be argued that fiscal 
policy reflected congressional rather than presidential influences. How- 
ever, the contractionary fiscal policy in 1960 reflected the administra- 
tion's conservative impulse more than the will of Congress. As Wilfred 
Lewis points out: "Congress showed far less enthusiasm for expendi- 
ture restraint in the 1960 election year than it had the year before, and 
appropriations were subsequently increased in virtually every category 
except foreign aid. "35 
Nor can it be argued that monetary policy was to provide additional 
stimulus to offset contractionary fiscal policy. In the period before the 
1960 election, monetary policy was also exceedingly c ~ n t r a c t i o n a r y . ~ ~  
Furthermore, there appears to have been more agreement than dis- 
33 Carlson, "Estimates of the High-Employment Budget," pp. 10-11. 
34 Stein, The Fiscal Revolution, p. 364. 
35 Lewis, Federal Fiscal Policy, p. 240. 
36 See Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867-1960 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 617-20. 
agreement between the administration and the Federal Reserve on the 
thrust of monetary policy during this period. According to George Bach, 
"monetary authorities at the Federal Reserve by and large shared the 
White House view. "37 
While economists have traditionally focused on Eisenhower's ideol- 
ogy as an explanation for the economic policies surrounding the 1960 
presidential election, historians and others have often focused on the 
ambivalence of Eisenhower toward Nixon's presidential campaign. 
Stephen Ambrose, perhaps the most thorough of Eisenhower's biogra- 
phers, attributes his attitude, at least in part, to his complex and often 
antagonistic relationship with the vice president.38 
Fueling the speculation about his limited endorsement of Nixon in 
1960 were various public comments by Eisenhower. On the eve of the 
1960 presidential election, in perhaps his most famous press conference, 
Eisenhower was asked repeatedly what decisions Nixon had partici- 
pated in as vice president. The president finally remarked: "If you give 
me a week, I might think of one. I don't remember."39 Two weeks 
earlier, when asked about Nixon's view on nuclear testing, Eisenhower 
remarked, "I can't recall what he has ever said specifically about 
nuclear underground testing. "40 
In reality, Eisenhower did very little to enhance the presidential 
prospects of Nixon and a great deal to jeopardize them. Under the guise 
of trying to further his vice president's career, Eisenhower suggested 
that Nixon take a Cabinet post to develop his administrative skills rather 
than remain on the ticket in 1956.~' In 1959 Eisenhower suggested 
changing the structure of the administration to include two "Assistant 
Presidents"-one in foreign affairs and one in domestic affairs.42 If, as 
Alben Barkley was fond of saying, the vice presidency wasn't worth a 
"bucket of warm spit," it would certainly be worth even less with this 
innovation. 
Although Eisenhower did not dump Nixon in 1956 and did not pursue 
the "Assistant President" idea in 1959, he also did not help Nixon raise 
campaign funds or endorse his candidacy until after the Republican 
Convention had nominated ~ i x o n . ~ ~  Eisenhower remained a distant 
relative throughout most of the 1960 campaign. According to Nixon, it 
was Eisenhower who decided when it would be time to "move into 
action."44 According to Eisenhower, however, it was Nixon who 
37 George L. Bach, Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy (Washington, DC, 1971), p. 102. 
38 Ambrose, Nixon, p. 509. 
39 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1960-61, pp. 657-58. 
40 Ibid., p. 626. 
4 1  For the official and unofficial story of this event, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 
(Garden City, 1965), pp. 6-9; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 292-93. 
42 Ambrose, Nixon, p. 51 1 .  
43 Arnbrose, Eisenhower, p. 512. Also see Public Papers of the Presidents, 1960-61, p. 144. 
44 Nixon, Six Crises, p. 349. 
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"suggested he stay out of the active campaign until the last few 
days."45 This, of course, was not the first time they had disagreed on 
who was making decisions. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Eisenhower presidency provides a compelling counterexample to 
the political business cycle hypothesis that presidents will manipulate 
the economy to enhance their re-election prospects. While Eisenhower 
engaged in highly contractionary policies upon entering office, he did 
not engage in significantly expansionary policies before the 1956 and 
1960 presidential elections. 
Economists have generally been satisfied with attributing these eco- 
nomic policies to Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism. For many, "Eisen- 
hower epitomized the chief executive who sets an economic policy 
course early in the administration and holds tightly" to its central 
tenets.46 The evidence presented here, however, indicates that' the 
highly contractionary fiscal policy before the 1960 presidential election 
is not consistent with the flexible fiscal conservatism exhibited through- 
out much of the Eisenhower presidency. 
Instead, the evidence on fiscal policy is consistent with those inter- 
pretations that view fiscal policy before the 1960 election as an anom- 
aly-possibly influenced by Eisenhower's relationship with Nixon. As 
Ambrose has observed: "Time and again, Eisenhower could have done 
things that Nixon urged on him that could have swayed votes, but he 
always refused."47 It is clear that for Eisenhower as for other presi- 
dents, ideology alone provides an insufficient explanation for policy 
actions which must be understood in the context of other political, 
economic, social, and, perhaps, personal factors. 
45 Arnbrose, Nixon, p. 558. 
46 Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology," p. 944. 
47 Arnbrose, Nixon, p. 513. 
